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ABSTRACT
The techniques described herein enable customers to leverage existing investments
in legacy non-containerized firewalls or other legacy appliances while performing those
security, and other, functions on traffic originating from new containerized workloads
running elsewhere in the enterprise. This provides an end-to-end solution that solves a
number of pragmatic real world problems that enterprise customers will face as they move
toward cloud and containers while wanting to leverage their existing investments in
security and firewall appliances.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Container-related problems may arise when an enterprise has an existing legacy
firewall that it wants to continue using for various reasons including leveraging existing
investments and the ability to provision a single firewall for existing non-containerized
workloads as well as new containerized workloads. This enterprise/customer may want to
introduce container clusters, run new containerized applications on them, and still use the
existing non-containerized firewall. Deploying new fully containerized firewalls is not an
option for such a customer.
Since using new container firewall products is not an option for such customers,
there is a need for a new solution that leverages existing non-containerized firewalls. The
key problem constraint here is the need to continue using existing non-containerized
firewalls for the next few years.
Today, there exist limitations to deploying a new container. Since traffic originating
from the container clusters is typically source Network Address Translated (NATed), by
the time the traffic arrives at the external firewall, visibility of the originating container
pod or service of this traffic has already been lost, which limits the flexibility by which the
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external firewall can perform appropriate security actions. This is illustrated in Figure 1
below.

Figure 1

As shown, Kubernetes pods A and B are running two different applications in the
cluster. In the existing (non-Kubernetes portion) of the enterprise, there is a
sensitive/confidential database service that not all users or applications in the enterprise are
permitted to access. This database may hold quarterly sales numbers, for instance. In one
example, the application or user running in pod A is not permitted to access this external
database service whereas the application or user running in pod B is required and permitted
to use this external database service. However, since both these pods are source NATed to
the same source IP address (and dynamically assigned Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) ports), it is not possible for the firewall provisioning system to configure a firewall
rule that would allow the application B to access the confidential database service while
blocking application A from accessing it. For example, in Figure 1 above, the firewall
provisioning is set in a way that blocks traffic from both pods A and B towards the database
service, which is not the desired behavior.
This problem can also be generalized to other similar scenarios involving the
identity of pods trying to access services in the enterprise and the need for easily enforcing
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policies that need to have better visibility of the container/pod originating traffic sent to the
rest of the enterprise. Many similar scenarios may arise when integrating Kubernetes
clusters with existing enterprise infrastructures.
One example solution is described herein, although it will be appreciated that
further enhancements and options may be included.
Figure 2 below illustrates the same scenario as in Figure 1 above but with additional
capabilities that solve the aforementioned problem.

Figure 2

There are two main areas of change. First, there is an enhanced Software Defined
Networking (SDN) container with a capability referred to herein as “Flexible Source NAT”
or “Flex-SNAT”. Second, there is a module referred to herein as the “appliance
interconnect module” that resides within the firewall provisioning system. This module has
the ability to make Representational State Transfer (REST) Application Programming
Interface (API) calls to the Kubernetes control plane and read/write certain settings. Now,
the enterprise Information Technology (IT) administrator has the ability to designate that
project A cannot obtain access to the confidential database while project B can.
Accordingly, the appliance interconnect module programs Kubernetes to use the Flex
SNAT capability of the enhanced SDN container and use a source IP address of S1 when
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performing source NAT on traffic originated by pods that belong to project A and a source
IP address of S2 when performing source NAT on traffic originated by pods that belong to
project B.
By leveraging Kubernetes labels, there are many additional and flexible ways this
mapping of IP addresses to appropriate source NAT parameters can be configured. Now,
the same appliance interconnect module is also leveraged by the firewall provisioning
system to provision the firewall correctly. In the example below, the firewall is
programmed to accept traffic with the source IP address of S2 but block traffic with the
source IP address of S1. These values were dynamically generated (from a range of
possible values) by the combination of Kubernetes control plane, SDN container with
flexible data plane capabilities including Flex-SNAT, and the appliance interconnect
module. In addition, as service meshes is added, the (e.g., envoy) data plane may also be
leveraged to insert additional metadata or remapping into the traffic in order to assist
service functions such as firewalls outside of the Kubernetes cluster.
Several additional details and enhancements are also provided further to the
solution described above. First, the solution uses flexible SNAT, but can be broadened and
implemented using additional options as well. For example, if unique source IP addresses
are scarce, then a programmable combination of source IP address and source ports may
be used (and optionally even other Layer 2 (L2) / Layer 3 (L3) / Layer 4 (L4) packet fields
can be leveraged including a Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) tag, IP Differentiated
Services Code Point (DSCP), etc.). The solution described herein is independent of the
actual packet field used for the flexible NAT logic. This also addresses the potential
scarcity of source IP addresses.
This allows for integrating not just with external legacy firewalls but also other
functions such as legacy monitoring systems and other appliances. Since a key benefit is
to increase the visibility and markability of traffic originating from a container cluster, the
same logic can be used with other types of appliances as well.
The example solution described above used an SDN container as an example
implementation. The solution could also be implemented in other container networking
implementations including Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) or envoy data planes
to allow for further flexibility. The solution described herein allows for flexible awareness
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of container identities into the outside world for the purpose of enforcing policies as
described above.
In summary, the techniques described herein enable customers to leverage existing
investments in legacy non-containerized firewalls or other legacy appliances while
performing those security, and other, functions on traffic originating from new
containerized workloads running elsewhere in the enterprise. This provides an end-to-end
solution that solves a number of pragmatic real world problems that enterprise customers
will face as they move toward cloud and containers while wanting to leverage their existing
investments in security and firewall appliances.
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